The outcome of European elections could prompt a shift in EU policymaking. While the EU’s traditional powerhouses, the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), retained their status as the bloc’s largest parliamentary groups, the far right grew. Both the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the even more radical Identity and Democracy (ID) gained seats compared to the 2019 elections. 

There are concerns that ID and ECR, despite their policy differences, might merge into a supergroup. Even if they don’t join forces, they could coordinate and collaborate on common issues, in the process forming an ideological bulwark against the EU’s foundational values. A key one of these could be the European Union’s enlargement, a cornerstone of the bloc’s foreign agenda in the last years, and a process towards which far-right parties are less open.  

Currently, nine countries hold EU candidate status: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye, and Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought new urgency to EU enlargement, seen as a geopolitical strategy to ensure long-term regional security. Prior to the war, the accession process was ongoing on paper but mostly stalling.  

Things are moving slowly for most Western Balkan candidate states, where the EU feels less geopolitical pressure, and where leaders, like Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, have sought ways to keep ties with both the EU and Russia. Western Balkan countries could grow impatient if accession proceeds rapidly for Ukraine and Moldova alone, or stalls altogether in the new European Parliament.  

Many far-right parties that gained ground in the European Parliament oppose EU enlargement due to financial costs associated with both pre- and post-accession processes, as well as the prospect of increased migration flows. When far-right actors do support the accession of specific countries, they are often driven by narrow national interests or an emphasis on historical ties and cultural proximity. For example, Poland’s Law and Justice party perceives Ukraine’s accession as vital for Polish security, while Romania’s AUR considers Moldova an integral part of Romanian territory. 

The well-documented affinity for Russia among parts of the far right could also sway their actions within the Parliament, particularly in regard to countries whom Moscow considers to be within its “sphere of influence” pursuing EU membership. The impact of their anti-enlargement positions could extend beyond efforts to block the ratification of accession treaties during the Parliament’s qualified majority vote at the end of negotiations: far-right parties may also seek to undermine support for resolutions promoting democratic processes and rule of law in these countries, or impede the work of parliamentary committees tasked with bolstering democratic reforms in aspiring member states. 

Georgia: A nation at a crossroads  

One country that could bear the brunt of shifting EU power dynamics is Georgia, which obtained candidate status in December 2023. Compared to Moldova and Ukraine, Tbilisi lacks a strong advocate for its EU integration among member states. A further obstacle on Georgia’s EU path is a controversial “foreign agents” law reminiscent of Russian authoritarianism. 

The law, pushed through by the ruling Georgian Dream party, requires non-profit organisations and media outlets receiving more than 20 per cent of their funding from abroad to register as bodies “pursuing the interests of a foreign power.” The party’s supermajority of 90 MPs in the 150-seat parliament allowed them to override a presidential veto against it. The law’s passage also defied peaceful demonstrations by thousands of Georgians. According to a 2023 poll, 89 per cent of Georgian citizens support EU membership. 

The ruling party’s stance on Russia is ambiguous. Its founder, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who amassed his fortune in Russia, has prioritised normalising relations with Moscow, a position manifested in the party’s abstention from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This stance is particularly jarring given Russia’s occupation of Georgia’s territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008, which Moscow continues to exploit to destabilise the country and thwart its EU and NATO aspirations. Paradoxically, however, Georgia remains largely aligned with the Western-imposed sanctions against Russia. 

An explanation for this ambiguous approach lies in the Georgian leadership’s belief that insufficient Western military support has failed to halt Russia’s advance, with Moscow now controlling large parts of Ukraine and the balance of power shifting in its favour. This fuels concerns in Tbilisi over whether the West would provide adequate support if Russia attacked Georgia. As many Georgian officials see it, NATO’s eastward expansion was what provoked Moscow’s invasion.  

Simultaneously, the conflict in Ukraine has heightened Georgia’s geopolitical importance, as most of the EU’s critical energy routes bypassing Russia converge on the small Caucasus nation. Russia has not overlooked this strategic value. In 2023, Moscow made overtures to Tbilisi by lifting visa requirements for Georgian citizens and reopening air links – concessions that provide Georgia greater room to manoeuvre its relationships with both the EU and Russia. 

Champion of democratic values  

The European Parliament has been a supportive force for Georgian protesters’ efforts against the “foreign agents” law. Its president, Roberta Metsola, wrote in a post on social media platform X: “Tbilisi, we hear you! We see you!” emphasising that Georgian protestors desire a “European future.” 

It also passed a resolution in April condemning the law as incompatible with “EU values and democratic principles, running against Georgia’s ambitions for EU membership,” and stating that it damaged the country’s international reputation. The resolution also stressed that Georgia’s accession negotiations “should not be opened as long as this law is part of Georgia’s legal order.” 

Although the Georgian government still passed the law, the resolution shows the Georgian people that they are not alone in their struggle, and that they are being heard – not by their government, but by the Union that many of them so badly wish to join. It provides an impulse to keep protesting and demand change. These types of actions elevate the European Parliament from a passive bystander to an active champion of democratic values in Georgia and a contributor to progressive discussions in the candidate country.  

This is not the first resolution supporting Georgian rule of law and democracy. In 2022, the Parliament passed a resolution condemning the “increasing number of cases of intimidation, threats, violence, and the persecution of journalists.” It urged Georgian authorities to investigate and prosecute those responsible for violent attacks on journalists and to protect media freedom. 

Beyond this, the European Parliament directly engages with Georgia through dedicated committees focused on issues of concern in the candidate country. A prime example is the EU-Georgia Parliamentary Association Committee, which convenes twice a year. Comprising members of the European Parliament and Georgian parliamentarians, it focuses on tackling shared EU-Georgia concerns and overseeing the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, which fosters crucial democratic reforms in the country. The European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the South Caucasus (DSCA) monitors the Committee’s work. 

A gathering storm 

In the coming months, the EU’s support for Georgia and other candidate countries might significantly diminish because it is contested by far-right forces. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), which won over 30 per cent of the EU vote in France, has framed enlargement as a threat to member states’ sovereignty. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, RN opposed granting candidate status to the six nations in the EU’s Eastern Partnership, which includes Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. RN also associates EU enlargement with an influx of migrants into France, propelling the narrative that immigration threatens French citizens due to issues like unemployment.  

Like other parties in the ID parliamentary group, RN maintains a pro-Russia stance and ties with Moscow. In 2014, a 6 million euro loan from a Russian bank helped rescue the party from the brink of bankruptcy. Ahead of the European elections this year, RN’s leadership moved to address the potential fallout from this Russian connection by repaying the debt.  

While condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Marine Le Pen has advocated for closer ties with the country on issues like counterterrorism. She has also called for sanctions against it to be lifted, claiming they serve no purpose and only make Europeans, including the French, suffer. 

Other far-right parties, like Austria’s FPO, also argue against EU enlargement due to costs. They claim that investments in new member states threaten the Union’s economic balance, as these countries typically receive substantial EU funds while contributing little during their initial accession phase. The FPO was the big winner of EU elections in Austria, with almost 26 per cent of the vote.  

Divisions within the far-right 

Despite signs of collaboration between European far-right parties, there are also significant divisions. Ahead of the elections, the ID group decided to exclude Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) from its ranks following scandals involving its candidates. These scandals include lead candidate Maximilian Krah stating that not every member of the Nazi SS was automatically a criminal. (The AfD still won 16 per cent of the vote in Germany). The German party has ousted Krah from its EU delegation and is seeking ways to re-enter ID, which would boost the group’s numbers.  

EU enlargement itself might cause divergence, with some far-right parties supporting the accession of certain candidate countries, and others opposing it altogether. Ukraine’s accession could become an especially contentious point between ECR and the more hardline ID. Many ECR parties, like Poland’s PiS and Brothers of Italy, have adopted a more supportive Ukraine stance, making them appear more palatable interlocutors for traditional parties. If ECR forces become part of the Council’s majority, as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen suggested before the elections, it could have significant knock-on effects for enlargement.  

There is also the possibility that parts of the EPP might turn against enlargement. The financial burden of enlargement could serve as a unifying factor that transcends ideological divides, particularly given the economic hardships many member states are experiencing. According to a 2023 internal Council note, the EU would need to allocate around 186 billion euros over seven years for Ukraine alone. Including the six candidate countries, as well as Georgia and Moldova, would require an additional 74 billion euros.  

Parliamentary reform efforts  

In an effort to address some of these foreseeable challenges, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in early 2024 aimed at making the enlargement process more efficient and sustainable. The resolution supported the gradual integration of candidate countries into the single market during the accession process to ensure that the EU can absorb new members without excessive financial and migration strain. 

It also proposed replacing the Council’s unanimous voting requirement with qualified majority voting, aiming for a more flexible and streamlined enlargement process. This proposal anticipated the likely rise of far-right parties in some EU governments, which could also be reflected in the Council’s composition, making unanimous consensus increasingly elusive. 

While the European Parliament’s contribution to a successful and realistic EU enlargement strategy is invaluable, proposals that seek to reconcile the Union’s foundational values with the harsh political and economic realities of the present day are likely to become increasingly rare in the coming years, as the Union confronts a perfect storm of populism and economic insecurity. 

For candidate countries like Georgia, striving to maintain their EU trajectory amid this turbulent landscape, the road ahead appears arduous and uncertain. As they also grapple with internal turmoil and faltering democratic reforms, their hopes of EU membership could become a casualty of the continent’s deepening political fragmentation – a sobering prospect that underscores the urgent need for resilience, unity, and an unwavering commitment to the guiding values of the European project.