Considering that the far right has been on the rise for years, it no longer seems adequate to speak of right-wing forces as a new phenomenon. Populists and right-wing conservatives have long gained a foothold in regional and national elections across European member states, with Italy, Finland, Greece, Germany, and the Netherlands being just a few examples. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the new European Parliament will reflect this turn to the right. 

More recent developments such as the pandemic, the cost of living crisis, and the threat of economic recession have also played into the hands of right-wing populists. Fears of economic decline leave little room for ambitious agendas like the green transformation. In an effort to stop the shift to the far right, German liberal and progressive parties’ European campaign included terms like “defending”, “protecting”, and “preventing”, which are typically associated with conservative politics. This inward-looking campaign, which was not limited to Germany, was in stark contrast to the 2019 European elections, when the European Greens achieved their best result ever largely thanks to Europe-wide climate mobilisation. Now, progressives seem to be on the defence, with issues such as war and economic insecurity overriding ecological concerns. 

Rather than a mobilising factor for progressives, the green transition has been harnessed by its critics – market radicals, conservatives, and far-right actors – to gather consensus. In Germany, this “green backlash” appears to be paying off: The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has been actively fuelling resentment against the green transition with its populist rhetoric that frames ambitious climate policies as an “eco-dictatorship”, came in second at the European elections with 16 per cent of the vote. The party is also projected to win three major state elections in Eastern Germany this year (Brandenburg, Thuringia, Saxony). Meanwhile, the centre-right CDU has been quick to jump on anti-green narratives, launching a campaign against the 2035 de-facto ban of new combustion engine cars ahead of the European elections.  

Yet the need for radical climate protection and adaptation is becoming ever more pressing. Severe flooding and heatwaves across Central and Southern Europe are the new norm. Just this month, extreme rainfall has seen municipalities underwater across Southern Germany, causing the death of four people and inflicting extensive damage to the local infrastructure. It is the third major flooding event in Germany this year. With the effects of climate change being felt more frequently across Europe, it is essential for the EU to continue pursuing the objectives of the European Green Deal, which aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.  

Now that the vision of a climate-neutral and ecologically sustainable future appears to be losing traction among European voters, how can progressives regain popular support for the green transition?  

A recent study on Germany’s green transition by the Berlin-based think tank Das Progressive Zentrum and the Research Institute for Sustainability Helmholtz Centre Potsdam suggests that focusing on three key areas – implementation, process, and vision – could help drive social acceptance of ecological goals.

Implementation: Strengthening municipalities 

Climate policy and decarbonisation strategies are negotiated at the national or international level. The EU defines emission targets and national governments are tasked with accelerating the expansion of renewable energy. However, wind and solar farms are built at the communal level. It is in people’s immediate environment that the nitty-gritty of the energy transition is negotiated. Here, polarisation and conflict around infrastructure projects are felt most immediately. Local representatives therefore not only need to deal with the technical and administrative aspects of renewable energy deployment, but are also tasked with mediating the social tensions that arise from it.  

For local communities to perceive transformation processes as just, they must have a say in the decision-making phase and benefit materially from sustainability projects.  

When designing climate protection and adaptation policies such as the European Green Deal, the crucial role of municipalities and local representatives as strategic partners in the just transition is often neglected. Thus, the responsibility for implementing the respective measures is passed down to the lower governance levels without making the appropriate financial and personnel resources available.  

On the other hand, failing to regard municipalities as strategic partners in the just transition runs the risk of delaying necessary transformation measures due to local opposition and insufficient resources to mediate these conflicts. It is also a missed opportunity because a positive experience with local transformation processes has the potential to positively impact people’s general attitude towards the green transition. Effective implementation, therefore, entails providing municipalities with adequate competencies and resources to fulfil their crucial role. 

The Forum Energiedialog (FED) is a positive example of a strategic partnership between different governance levels in the energy transition. The FED is a project by the German state of Baden-Württemberg that assists municipalities in resolving energy-related conflicts through participatory dialogue. At the request of municipal representatives, external mediators and renewable energy experts can participate free of charge (the financial costs are covered by the environmental ministry of Baden-Württemberg). The Forum is committed to transparency and impartiality, ensuring that all perspectives are heard. This enhances the legitimacy of decision-making processes and their outcomes. The programme not only fosters a sense of shared responsibility between the regional government and local authorities, but it also provides tangible support for mayors who might otherwise delay renewable energy deployment for fear of conflict and polarisation.  

Process: Enabling material and immaterial participation 

Conflict resolution plays an important role in the implementation of the green transition at the municipal level. However, ​​in order for local communities to perceive transformation processes as just, they must have a say in the decision-making phase and benefit materially from sustainability projects.  

Whether or not the energy transition is perceived as fair, depends to a large extent on how people experience it in their immediate environment. Are local concerns about the construction of a wind farm addressed? Do citizens have a say in where wind parks are located and how they operate? Are the profits reaped by large companies with no connection to the region, or does the community benefit from investment returns? Both material and immaterial forms of participation are crucial to ensuring a just transition. This involves providing spaces for information, dialogue, and conflict resolution (immaterial participation), as well as ensuring financial returns for the community (material participation). 

The EU has adopted clear guidelines for material participation. Both the Renewable Energy Directive and the European Green Deal mandate that the energy transition should benefit consumers and create opportunities for participation. However, the current focus is predominantly on enhancing financial participation opportunities for private individuals (as shareholders). The involvement of municipalities and the associated indirect returns for citizens receive less attention. However, studies show that population groups with limited socio-economic and socio-cultural capital are reached less effectively through direct financial participation, such as in citizen energy projects. A shift towards municipal participation is therefore underway in various European countries.  

In the German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, along the Baltic Sea coast, the community of Hoort and its residents had the opportunity to buy shares in the local wind farm Hoort 2. While only a few individuals purchased shares in the wind farm (many households lacked the financial resources or feared the risks of private investment), the municipality’s revenues enabled local authorities to make new investments in communal infrastructure that benefits all residents. Examples include the renovation of the local kindergarten and the purchase of a new fire engine. When asked, both residents and local authorities agreed that models of financial participation, where individual households profit indirectly through the shares the municipality holds, were more equitable.  

If combined with a welfare-oriented investment strategy, the municipal revenues generated from renewable energy projects can contribute directly to improving the quality of life in local communities. For example, in Lichtenau, North Rhine-Westphalia, the financial returns of the local wind farm go to a foundation that funds social and cultural activities in the region. The returns also enable local authorities to lower water and electricity tariffs for the residents. It is such communally oriented measures that can boost local acceptance and identification with renewable energy projects, prompting some residents – as in the case of Hoort – to speak proudly of “our wind park”. 

However, material participation is not enough. Residents often also wish to have a say in where a solar park is built or when a wind farm can operate. Mediation and conflict resolution efforts such as Baden-Württemberg’s FED help, but they typically end in the construction phase, which is when conflicts often turn virulent. It is therefore important that immaterial forms of participation accompany transformation processes at the local level in the long term. While dialogical participation does not mean that the outcome will always reflect everyone’s preference, it is a way of ensuring that the decision-making process is perceived as democratically fair. If done well, immaterial participation can foster feelings of acceptance, justice, and control.  

Vision: Transitioning to what?  

To remain desirable even at times of economic hardship and uncertainty about the future, the green transformation cannot be based merely on long-term ecological goals. If people perceive climate policies as a top-down imposition with no direct material benefits (such as lower energy prices or cheap, efficient public transport), they are unlikely to embrace them. A progressive vision for the green transformation should therefore harness the synergies between climate policy and improvements in quality of life. The secondary benefits of sustainability transformations, such as independence from gas and oil imports, protection from energy price fluctuations thanks to renewables, and redistribution of revenues from local wind or solar farms should be given much more prominence when advocating for climate policy.  

A progressive vision for the green transformation should harness the synergies between climate policy and improvements in quality of life.

Five online citizen dialogues that helped shape the structural development programme of Saxony-Anhalt, East Germany, underline the importance of directing ecological ambitions towards improving the quality of living at the local level. The online dialogues involved citizens in setting the state’s investment priorities to foster structural change in post-coal regions. While the dialogues improved the visibility and accessibility of decision-making processes, the overall vision of a structural transformation remained abstract. Participants often voiced the need for addressing concrete local and regional issues such as poor infrastructure, instead of focusing on structural change. Therefore, the challenge – and the opportunity – lies in integrating local concerns and aspirations into a broader vision for a just transformation.  

Way forward 

The green transformation must be tackled simultaneously at various levels. In order to foster feelings of justice and control, its implementation needs to be negotiated at the local level. This requires material and immaterial forms of participation to enhance the democratic legitimacy and social acceptance of transformation processes and ensure a fair distribution of costs and benefits. Moreover, this must be accompanied by a vision for the green transition that foregrounds the positive improvements to the quality of life in people’s immediate environment. 

Positive experiences with transformation processes and democratic participation at the local level have the potential to make people less susceptible to anti-green narratives. Efforts to protect the European Green Deal in light of the recent shift to the right after the European elections should therefore go hand in hand with strategically partnering up with and supporting promoters of the green transition in municipalities across the EU.