When we reflect on climate change denial and the deceptive disinformation campaigns that surround it, we usually think of fossil-fuel giants such as Shell and ExxonMobil. For decades, misrepresentations peddled by these companies have spread a web of confusion around the true nature of climate change. Their profit-driven opposition to any move to phase out fossil fuels continues to linger, casting a shadow over our shared future.

But no representation of the climate-sceptic movement would be complete without taking into account the often-overlooked role of Russian propaganda in fuelling climate disinformation. In recent years, pro-Kremlin media outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik News have been criticised for disseminating false information about climate science. However, the tone of President Vladimir Putin’s public statements on climate science and policies has frequently shifted. This ambiguity offers a good insight into the evolution of climate change denial in the country.

Shifting narratives 

In 2003, when asked whether Russia would sign the Kyoto Protocol, Putin answered that climate change would probably not be a bad thing in a cold country like Russia. “Two to three degrees wouldn’t hurt,” he said. “We would spend less on fur coats, and the grain harvest would increase.”

More than a decade later, Russia was among the last countries to sign the Paris Agreement. On that occasion, Putin publicly acknowledged climate change as a serious threat and made an ambitious promise to slash Russia’s emissions by 70 to 75 per cent compared to 1990 levels. Yet no concrete action followed.

Any hope for a greener Putin was short-lived. In 2017, he claimed that the amount of greenhouse gases produced by volcanic eruptions exceeded that generated by human activity. The following year, he stated that alterations in the global environment, variations in cosmic ray intensity, and undetectable shifts in the galaxy were the true causes of climate change.

2020 seemed to mark a shift from outright denial to more subtle forms of climate delay characterised by criticism of emerging green technologies and accompanied by moderately promising developments. In April 2021, Putin asked his cabinet to create a strategy to significantly cut Russia’s emissions, and in September of the same year he announced the ambitious goal of achieving net zero by 2060 – an objective in line with countries such as China and Saudi Arabia. Many saw this announcement as a breakthrough that would bring Russia, the world’s fourth-largest greenhouse gas emitter, onto the shared path to decarbonisation. 

But in spite of its signature of the Paris Agreement and these positive developments, Russia has never made serious efforts to decarbonise its economy. Independent research group Climate Action Tracker (CAT) rates Russia’s climate transition as “critically insufficient” due to its lack of real commitment to curbing greenhouse gas emissions. CAT notes that the Russian Federation’s Energy Strategy to 2035, adopted in 2021, “focuses almost exclusively on promoting fossil fuel extraction, consumption, and exports to the rest of the world”, concluding that “such a strong focus on increasing reliance on fossil fuel revenues poses a considerable economic risk” in a future compatible with the 1.5-degree target.

The environmental cost of war 

In February 2022, the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine dealt a final blow to the international credibility of Putin’s declared climate goals.

In Ukraine, forest fires sparked by bombs and missiles, explosions at oil depots and gas-fired power plants, and the deployment of fossil fuel-powered heavy military vehicles and equipment have caused serious environmental damage. At the same time, however, the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe resulted in a decline in emissions and accelerated the global transition away from fossil fuels.

After its invasion of Ukraine, Russia found itself politically isolated and unattractive to foreign investors who could contribute to the modernisation of its economy. In an article in The Conversation, environmental historian Katja Doose and geographer Alexander Vorbrugg wrote that the economic sanctions imposed on Moscow “have strong implications for Russia’s already slow and rather unsure green transition, be it the modernisation of its energy sector or climate science”.

Russian research institutions have also been sanctioned by foreign governments and scientific bodies as a consequence of the war. Russia’s participation in Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research programme, has been suspended, and collaborations with the national research councils of various European countries have been put on hold. Moscow now lacks the foreign technologies needed for scientific research – a direct result of the prohibition on exporting electronic devices to Russia that could be used for military purposes. In the Arctic, research has largely stalled, and climate scientists in Russia have been denied access to the Climate Data Store, a platform that provides a centralised access point to a broad array of climate-related datasets.

Authoritarian climate scepticism

But what does climate discourse look like in Russia? A recent study found that climate scepticism plays a significant role in both Russian and Western public debate. In Europe and the US, scepticism is largely “reactive”, competing within social arenas around the framing of climate change. Under Russia’s authoritarian regime, however, public debate is dominated by opportunistic state interests defined by political, business, and media elites. Instead of developing as a “conservative countermovement” fighting a progressive movement, Russian climate change denial reflects the flexible policies of a state whose budget is largely dependent on fossil fuels. In this sense, Russian climate policies are consistent in their inconsistency. Putin may have signed the Paris Agreement and declared his intention to decarbonise the economy, but he also launched a major war of Ukraine that was only possible due to financing from fossil fuel exports.

In spite of its signature of the Paris Agreement, Russia has never made serious efforts to decarbonise its economy.

One of the distinctive features of Russian climate scepticism is that it is not always rooted in a free-market ideology. In the West (the US in particular), climate sceptics typically resort to libertarian arguments against climate policies, which they perceive as a threat to the free market and a free society. While Russia never fully adopted this model, it has nevertheless had some influential pro-market voices. Economist Andrei Illarionov, one of Putin’s key advisors on climate change in the 2000s and now a staunch critic of the current regime, believed that the Kyoto Protocol would hinder economic development and instead supported pro-market policies.

Alternative science 

This political context also has implications for the role of science in Russian society. In the past, by discrediting the evidence on climate change, Russian scientists played a significant role in legitimising opposition to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Current political debates on the potential benefits of global warming for agriculture, as well as for the accessibility and appeal of the Northern Sea Route and the Arctic, will no doubt receive similar support.

In the past, certain Russian scientists went as far as to defend climate denial. Astrophysicist Khabibullo Abdussamatov, head of the Space Research Laboratory at Pulkovo Observatory, suggested that solar radiation has a greater impact on the Earth’s climate than human activity, and that we are about to enter a new ice age. During the Kyoto Protocol ratification process, he argued in favour of postponing it by at least 150 years. Other scientists, such as the late atmospheric physicist Kirill Kondratyev, have criticised the climate modelling methodology and tried to “debunk the myth of climate change”.

Another influential figure was physicist Yuri Izrael, who held prominent positions at the World Climate Conferences, the IPCC, and the Russian Academy of Sciences. Izrael strongly opposed the IPCC’s findings and the Kyoto Protocol. In 2001, the Russian Academy of Sciences released a two-page memorandum arguing that there was a “high level of uncertainty as to whether the temperature rise […] was in fact due to human activity”. In the early 2000s, Izrael was a policy advisor to President Putin, and his opinions held considerable political sway.

After the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, climate scepticism among Russian scientists underwent developments similar to those observed in Europe and the Anglosphere. The debate started to move from outright denial to a more nuanced questioning of human causation and the real impacts of climate change. This shift was accompanied by claims that the ability of Russian forests to absorb carbon emissions was much higher than previously thought. In their 2022 study on Russian climate scepticism, Teresa Ashe and Marianna Poberezhskaya showed that prominent scientists played a major role in the emergence of climate scepticism between 1998 and 2004. Their importance seemed to decline from 2008 to 2012 during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, which was marked by a more pro-climate policy stance – similar to that adopted by Putin in 2021.

Climate-sceptic propaganda in the media 

In Western democracies, the media plays a major role in disseminating climate scepticism. The fact that public opinion can contribute to pressuring governments and shaping policy decisions explains the importance of trying to control the media narrative. In Russia, however, the influence of public opinion on policy-making is limited. For this reason, and due to the Russian elites’ limited interest in climate change at that time, there was initially little coverage of climate change in the country’s media.

Between 2000 and 2014, however, coverage of climate change increased in Russia, and climate scepticism became a prominent narrative. This trend could be attributed to the perceived dangers that the recognition of anthropogenic climate change would entail for an economy reliant on energy exports. But the lack of trust in authoritative sources that has become ingrained in the wider attitudes of Russian society thanks to decades of state propaganda also played a key role. While there is no clear indication of censorship regarding anthropogenic climate change, the media appears to closely align with the government’s shifting stance on the issue.

Climate discourse in the Russian media often slides into the realm of disinformation. Established in 2015 “to improve public awareness and understanding of the Kremlin’s disinformation operations”, the European Commission’s EUvsDisinfo project has been mapping the most radical, conspiratorial form of Russian disinformation. According to its findings, the underlying assumption of various pro-Kremlin media outlets is that climate change is a Western conspiracy that goes against Russian interests.

Examples abound, also internationally. E-journal Oriental Review, for instance, has suggested links between Hitler and climate change. An article in the New Eastern Outlook, overseen by the Russian Academy of Sciences, claims that an upcoming period of reduced solar activity known as the “solar minimum” is likely the reason for extreme weather conditions. And online magazine Strategic Culture Foundation has repeatedly claimed that the climate change agenda aims to reduce the world’s population. All of these online outlets have been subject to US and UK government sanctions for spreading disinformation.

Similar conspiracy theories have reached the highest echelons of the Russian elite. In 2019, Duma member Aleksey Zhuravlyov suggested that extreme weather events were the result of US weapons designed to alter the climate. Russian state news agency RIA Novosti has made a similar claim that Western powers are engaged in experiments with climate weapons. And on RT, Swedish climate striker Greta Thunberg was the subject of defamatory articles portraying her as the hateful “children’s crusader” of an alleged “environmental elite”.

The future of decarbonisation in Russia 

The role of Russia in tackling climate change is crucial, but if the country is to undergo meaningful decarbonisation, substantial and rapid policy change is needed. However, such changes are unlikely to take place. Internationally, the sanctions imposed on Russia due to its war on Ukraine are restricting access to the financial and technological resources necessary for the energy transition. And at the domestic level, the prevalence of climate scepticism in the media and the heavy reliance of the Russian economy on fossil fuels explain the reluctance of the country’s elite to pursue decarbonisation efforts.

Russia’s fossil fuel-dependent model is likely to gradually become outdated.

Aside from the difficulties associated with the energy transition, a further reason for this lack of action is the notion that Russia could profit from rising global temperatures to become a “climate winner”. According to this narrative, the large swathes of Siberia that are currently too frozen to support life or economic activity could become habitable with the rapid thawing of permafrost (which currently covers nearly two thirds of Russia). The melting of the Arctic could also open up new shipping lanes. In theory, this could lead to the expansion of industry, resource mining, and agricultural production.

In reality, the consequences of climate change are already having a destructive impact on Russia. Its territory is warming 2.5 times faster than the world average. Siberia has experienced an abnormally high number of wildfires, which also emit huge amounts of carbon into the atmosphere, and dozens of villages have been destroyed in flash floods. Meanwhile, the thawing of the permafrost poses very serious threats; rather than opening up new possibilities, it is eroding urban infrastructure and threatening oil and gas pipelines, roads, and railways.

Permafrost degradation may also cause the release of vast amounts of methane currently trapped within and below it, what some scientists refer to as a “methane bomb”. Methane is considered to have 84 times the warming power of carbon dioxide and is currently responsible for about 30 per cent of global warming. Unknown bacteria and viruses emerging from the melting Arctic region pose an additional threat, as shown by the 2016 anthrax outbreak in northern Siberia.

These developments prove that climate collapse is a lose-lose scenario for everyone, including Russia. Yet given the country’s current situation, it is hard to predict what could change the trajectory of its economy.

With more countries moving towards the energy transition, Russia’s fossil fuel-dependent model is likely to gradually become outdated. This, along with political developments inside Russia and the uncertain outcome of the war in Ukraine, will play a crucial role in defining the country’s (currently non-existent) path to decarbonisation.

Even after the end of the war, concrete actions aimed at climate mitigation may constitute a prerequisite for the lifting of economic sanctions, thus becoming a tool for climate diplomacy. The harsh truth is that there cannot be any globally effective effort at reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement without Russia’s contribution.

This story was researched with support from Free Press Unlimited and E3J.