Climate change and environmental degradation are global challenges, which must be urgently tackled if we are to avoid catastrophic consequences. Addressing these mammoth challenges requires international cooperation and coordination of efforts that, frankly, has no precedent in human history. Yet, even as the EU charts its way towards a green and sustainable future, some of its strategies are predicated on the subjugation and dismissal of African interests. The EU’s approach to mitigating climate change has the effect of deepening diplomatic grievance and weakening its foreign policy, as well as perpetuating age-old exploitation of African resources.

The economic interdependence between Europe and Africa has a long history. At the 1884 Berlin Conference, the European powers decimated and delineated African territories on the basis of natural resources. During World War II, Britain and France relied upon African manpower to fight on the frontlines of a foreign war. The history of European-led colonisation and enslavement are testament to how European requirements have always dictated the nature of the Euro-African partnership.

The Green Deal in Africa

In July 2021, the European Commission decidedly stepped up to the challenge of mitigating climate change. The Commission adopted a set of policies to ensure that the EU evolves into a modern, resource-efficient, and competitive economy by reorienting its climate, energy, transport, and taxation policies. These proposals, under the umbrella of the European Green Deal, aim to transform Europe into the first climate-neutral continent in the world.

The Green Deal aims to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 per cent by 2030 and set the bloc on course for carbon neutrality by 2050. The assumption underlying the deal is that an ambitious reorientation of climate, energy, transport, and taxation policies should be sufficient to achieve the EU’s climate targets in a fair and cost-effective way. It is an attractive proposition, with a catchy mantra: “No net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050; economic growth decoupled from resource use; no person and no place left behind.”

The Green Deal typifies European strategic thinking on climate change. Conceived as an internal policy instrument of the European Commission, it proposes significant policy changes that will affect its foreign relations. One of the foreign policy areas that will be overhauled will be the nature of economic and political relationships between the EU and Africa. These changes are most visible in energy and in the critical raw materials trade.

The EU is Africa’s largest trading partner, accounting for around 28 per cent of African imports and exports, with crude oil exports and refined petroleum imports representing the lion’s share of this trade. As the EU seeks to wean itself off fossil fuels and electrify its economy, the economic relationship will be reconfigured by a decline in fossil fuel demand and a simultaneous increase in demand for critical raw materials.

Weaning Europe off crude oil will shrink exports from countries such as Libya and Nigeria that rely on the EU market. Reducing oil imports from north Africa is particularly important from a climate perspective given that emissions from oil and gas exploitation in this region are among the highest in the world. But the Green Deal approach glosses over the fact that the EU has not been forthcoming on the capacity building, technology transfer, and financial investment that these export countries have called for to lower sector-wide emissions. African leaders have lamented “being infantilised” by European leaders preaching the requirement to reduce emissions, without providing the necessary financing.

The Green Deal also depends on the exploitation of African resources for Europe’s green transition. For example, the EU aims to use natural gas as a bridge fuel to power a greener economy. Given the relative scarcity of natural gas in the EU, gas imports cover 83 per cent of demand. In 2021, Algeria fulfilled 13 per cent of EU natural gas demand, just after Russia and Norway. It seems that immense opportunities lie ahead – if Africans can adapt their extractive and export markets to cater to Europe’s needs.

Similarly, the EU’s electrification drive will increase its reliance on critical raw materials such as bauxite, cobalt, and platinum group metals from countries such as Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa. Analysts estimate that a ninefold increase in electric vehicle sales in the next 10 years will be associated with an almost 40 per cent increase in aluminium consumption. As a result, bauxite (the main source of aluminium) will increase in value. Guinea possesses the world’s largest reserves. For African countries with significant critical raw material reserves, there are ample economic opportunities to be had, but they will also shoulder the dirty side effects of Europe’s green transition.

European requirements have always dictated the nature of the Euro-African partnership.

The energy crisis

As these plans were taking shape, a European geopolitical crisis emerged in 2022, accelerating the new scramble for Africa. The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused major shocks to global energy markets and exposed the EU’s reliance on Russian gas supplies. Almost overnight, the EU embarked upon a scramble for Africa’s gas reserves. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz rushed hat in hand to Senegal in May 2022, eyeing its significant gas deposits. Italian president Sergio Mattarella hurried over to Mozambique in July 2022, keen to reduce Italy’s reliance on Russia. And Polish president Andrzej Duda toured West Africa, looking to improve energy supplies from Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal in September 2022.

Suddenly, European leaders were less concerned about African carbon emissions. Domestic political instability in export countries was also of little concern to European leaders. Neither the crippling insurgencies in Mozambique nor the ethical questions surrounding the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco could deter the influx of capital to fund the extraction of resources. There was also little recognition that Africa remains a continent where 580 million people lack access to sufficient energy. The reality is that African resources are more valuable when they cater to European demand at the expense of local demand. Several countries across the continent experienced historic levels of blackouts in 2022. It is said that “Africa will remain poor unless it uses more energy”. But that’s not important for now; there is a war in Europe.

Climate and environmental concerns cannot be divorced from issues of social justice, equal rights, and resource allocation. We cannot ignore the fact that the exploitation of Africa is intrinsic to European green solutions and that this exploitation requires the cooperation of the African elite. Yet, climate policy discourse in Europe ignores these difficult questions.

This cognitive dissonance is sustained through oversimplified and ahistorical climate policies such as the Green Deal. The Green Deal creates an artificial boundary delineating Europe’s climate responsibilities in a manner that prioritises continued Western overconsumption over the needs of the world’s most vulnerable. Not only does the European Green Deal carve out Europe’s green transition based on arbitrary geographical borders, it does so based on equally artificial markers in time.

Shared responsibility?

Humanity has “now emitted as much since 1990 as in all of history before that time”. The figure is a damning indictment of our collective and relentless exploitation of the planet. Based on the 1990 benchmark, it makes sense that each human must leverage all the tools at their disposal to suppress post-1990 emissions.

However, the 1990 benchmark relieves much of the developed world from their historical responsibility for this mess. The climate emergency did not start in 1990. When climate policy starts the clock from that point in history, it masks the regionally differentiated emissions responsibilities in favour of developed countries that have already enjoyed the benefits of accelerated development and industrialisation.

A fresh look at disaggregated emissions data reveals a very different climate reality. Historical emissions data from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research show that the average EU citizen emitted 279 tonnes of CO2from 1960 to 1990. In the same period, a sub-Saharan African produced a mere 28.4 tonnes. Such a disparity exists because of the waves of industrialisation, war, and development that EU states experienced, compared to sub-Saharan Africa, not to speak of the relentless extraction of natural resources enacted by much of Europe through colonisation. Colonisation, it turns out, has had a significant and measurable impact on emissions data.

From 1991 to 2021, the same European citizen produced 245.52 tonnes of emissions, compared to the African’s 26.5 tonnes. On a per capita basis, the data reveals just how differentiated our responsibilities for global warming truly are. What’s more, it underlines the inaccuracy of claiming universal and equal responsibility. A more accurate assertion would be that a European Union citizen is 10 times more responsible than a sub-Saharan African.

Notwithstanding these disparities, the EU is not currently seen as responsible for emissions. After all, the cumulative emissions of the EU in the 30 years on either side of 1990 appear stable, while those of countries in East and South Asia are rising. In fact, per capita disaggregation reveals that, from 1991 to 2021, an individual in Europe emitted 1.3 times more CO2 than their counterpart in East and South Asia. It gets even more interesting when we consider Europeans’ emissions per capita from 1960 to 1990, which were 3.9 times higher than East and South Asians.

The Green Deal creates an artificial boundary delineating Europe’s climate responsibilities in a manner that prioritises continued Western overconsumption.

By creating emissions targets pegged to 1990 levels, the Green Deal creates a flawed interpretation of history, masking the true scale of Europe’s contribution. The reality is that the Green Deal would have to aspire to well over 55 per cent reductions if it were to take cumulative emissions per capita into account. Otherwise, the only “neutrality” the Green Deal proposes is not one of emissions but of responsibility. Desmond Tutu had something to say about neutrality in the face of injustice…

This article began by stating the need for unprecedented international cooperation and coordination efforts to mitigate the impact of climate change and environmental degradation. But the elephant in the room remains our “collective responsibility”. The Green Deal, however well-intentioned, perpetuates a flawed reading of history and therefore a flawed distribution of responsibility. Equally flawed is the assumption that the EU (and other pre-1990 industrialised countries) can still enjoy sustainable economic growth if only they adjust their means of industrial production.

We have a responsibility to understand how our differentiated capacities for climate action today mirror the inequality of our historical relationships. The historical disparity of regional contributions to climate change must be reflected at the level of policy and diplomatic dialogue. Otherwise, the Western insistence on shared, equal, and ahistorical responsibility will only foster divisions. Many leaders from developing nations have already expressed their irritation with the status quo. It would be a good idea to listen to their concerns.